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ABSTRACT 
Graphic design applications are often used for the editing and design of digital art. The same 
applications can be used for creating counterfeit documents such as identity documents (IDs), driver’s 
licences, passports, etc. However, the use of any graphic design application leaves behind traces of 
digital information that can be used during a digital forensic investigation. Current digital forensic 
tools examine a system to find digital evidence, but they do not examine a system specifically for the 
creating of counterfeit documents created through the use of graphic design applications.  
The paper in hand reviews the system-generated digital forensic evidence gathered from certain 
graphic design applications, which indicates that a counterfeit document was created. This inference is 
made by associating the digital forensic information gathered with the possible actions taken, more 
specifically, the scanning, editing, saving and printing of counterfeit documents. The digital forensic 
information is gathered by analysing the files generated by the particular graphic design application 
used for creating the document. The acquired digital forensic information is corroborated to the 
creation of counterfeit documents and interpreted accordingly. In the end determining if a system was 
utilised for counterfeiting. 
Keywords: Digital evidence, Digital forensic, Digital forensic artifacts, Graphic design applications. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industries including but not limited to advertising, newspaper printing, architecture, fashion and 
design, project management and manufacturing make use of graphic designs for their corporations. 
Graphic design applications have enhancing tools like paint brushing, vector drawing, digital pen and 
pencil drawing, and many more. These graphic design applications are used to facilitate the creation of 
unique art for company logos, magazine advertising or computer-aided design, to mention but a few. 
Most industries make use of graphic design applications for visual presentations and use pictorial 
expressions that aid communication and the expression of ideas.  
Forged or counterfeit documents are, however, encountered and in circulation all over the world. The 
same graphic design applications used in modern industry can also be used for illegitimate purposes 
like creating counterfeit documents. Due to the exceptional editing and design capabilities of these 
applications they can easily be exploited and misused to create counterfeit documents like IDs, 
passports or drivers licences. According to a newspaper report by Ilham Rawoot of the Mail & 
Guardian, terrorist’s target fake South African passports because of the ease with which they can be 
faked [1]. Criminal activities such as these confirm the need for digital forensic investigations.  
Similar digital forensic papers have been published that identify image forgery or tampered images 
[18, 19]. However, not much has been done in such research to identify whether a specific system was 
used during a counterfeiting exercise. Therefore, if no evidence is available for proving that a 
counterfeited document exists, counterfeiting criminals can potentially get away with it. It is, thus, 
relevant to examine a system specifically for the potential existence of counterfeit documents. 
The use of graphic design applications leaves behind traces that can be revealed during a digital 
forensic investigation. A digital forensic investigation generally consists of the following phases 
consisting of the acquisition, examination, analysis and reporting [2]. Assuming that an individual is 
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suspected of creating counterfeit documents, the regular process of acquisition is followed. The phases 
of acquisition and reporting are generally similar in different cases; hence the emphasis is on the 
examination and analysis phases.  
This paper identifies the digital traces left behind when certain graphic design applications had been 
used. This is achieved by associating the possible actions taken during document creation with the 
traces left behind. The source of potential evidence referred to above equates to the results of possible 
actions (i.e. document scanning, editing, saving and printing) taken during document creation. Most of 
this evidence would originate from the application log files, referred to as system-generated evidence. 
 The work covered in this paper continues from previously-published work by the authors on “User-
generated digital forensic evidence from graphic design applications” [16]. The mentioned paper 
elaborates on gathering potential evidence on the actual files with counterfeit value created by the 
counterfeiter intentionally. As opposed to the previous paper [16], the focus of this paper is on the files 
generated by the graphic design application itself, mostly for the purpose of metadata that would hold 
potential evidence. Another similar paper published by the authors titled “Finding digital evidence 
from graphic design applications” [17], presented digital evidence on a high level.  
To address the problem, the authors focus on identifying the digital forensic information that shows 
whether a document was created through the mentioned four actions. In doing so, a link with the 
potential criminal may be established. However, it is not the aim of this paper to link the crime to an 
actual person but merely to establish that a counterfeit document was indeed created.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two starts off with some background on 
digital forensics, followed by a brief discussion on graphic design applications. Section three presents 
the system-generated digital forensic evidence gathered by means of two experiments, while Section 
four is an evaluation and discussion of the evidence extracted from the graphic design applications. 
Section five serves as conclusion to this paper.  
2. BACKGROUND 
In part A, the authors discuss the studied literature on digital forensics, followed by an explanation of 
digital evidence and a definition of digital forensic artifacts. Part B contains a brief discussion of the 
three Adobe graphic design applications used for the purposes of this study. 
2.1 Digital Forensics 
At the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) in 2001, digital forensics was defined as the 
use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection, validation, 
identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence derived 
from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found to 
be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorised actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations 
[3]. To reconstruct and understand what happened on a system in the past, data has to be gathered and 
analysed in a transparent manner.  
A digital forensic investigation focuses on finding digital evidence when a computer or network 
security incident has occurred, or locating data from systems that may form part of some litigation, 
even if such data has been deleted. In this context, evidence is critical and any items that can be 
considered to be of evidential value should be identified and collected [4]. 
Computer evidence or digital evidence is defined as any hardware, software or data that can be used to 
prove one or more of the ‘who, what, when, where, why and how’ questions pertaining to a security 
incident [5]. Computer evidence furthermore consists of digital files and their contents that are left 
behind after an incident. Casey defined digital evidence as any data that can be used to establish that a 
crime was committed or that can prove a link between a crime and its victim or an offender [6]. Digital 
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evidence consists entirely of sequences of binary values called bits [7]. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that the evidence should be presented in its logical form in court or at a disciplinary hearing. 
Traces left behind from the use of an application or operating systems are referred to as digital forensic 
artifacts [8]. An examiner reveals the truth of an event by discovering and exposing the remnants of 
the event that have been left on the system. Because of the loaded legal connotations binding the term 
‘evidence’, the term ‘artifacts’ is preferably used instead to refer to these remnants. When a perpetrator 
tries to remove these artifacts, it potentially leaves other artifacts behind. For example, in trying to 
remove log files from a system, one typically might use a removal tool, which leaves additional traces 
indicating that a log removal tool was used. The scattered evidence inside a system can indicate what 
has happened for a particular digital forensic investigation.  
Application artifacts left by installed applications can be an excellent source of potential evidence 
when performing an analysis. An artifact, however, does not become evidence unless its ability to 
prove a fact has been established [9]. Hence it is necessary to reconstruct events that occurred by 
gathering all the possible digital information from a system.  
The amount of research and development that has been undertaken in this field has not, to date, 
focused on the skills and of graphic design software, which is a particular area that is nearly always 
exploited for the purpose of creating counterfeit documents and images. Most research work that has 
been undertaken up till now has concentrated on image forensics, which is the kind of investigation 
that is able to determine whether or not an image as been forged or tempered [18,19].  
Lien [18], proposed a method that uses a pre-calculated resampling weighting table to detect periodic 
properties in error distribution within an image. The errors in the distribution within an image are used 
to determine if the image has been forged. Stamm [19] proposed a method to detect contrast 
enhancement and addition of noise in jpeg compression images. Changes in contrast and noise within 
an image are determined through the use of an algorithm that calculates pixel values within the image. 
The values are then used to detect forgery within the image.  Cohen [20] proposed a method that 
determines characteristics associated within digital still camera images to determine the origin of the 
image. The characteristics are compared to the exact replicas and derivates of other statistical images 
to detect forgery. These, [18, 19, 20], and other related work focus on determining forgery using 
statistical data within the image [21, 22, 23, 24].  
Very little of the research carried out to date has specifically investigated the ways and means in which 
documents are counterfeited. These ways also include the methods and procedures that can be used to 
detect such activities from graphic design applications, which is the focus of this paper. 
How and where evidence is located differs, depending on the crime being investigated, the platform 
(operating systems) and the application used to commit the crime. 
2.2 Graphic design applications 
Of the many graphic design applications currently available in the industry, Adobe Systems 
Incorporated is regarded as the largest software maker in the graphic design software category [10] 
and hence the reason for focussing on graphic design software from Adobe Systems for this research. 
Adobe Systems Incorporated owns software technologies that are used for online transactions, 
business applications and social technologies [11]. The case study for the current research was 
therefore conducted with Adobe graphic design applications, namely Photoshop and In-Design.  
3. DIGITAL FORENSIC EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM GRAPHIC DESIGN 
APPLICATIONS 
In this section, the authors start off by explaining the research method used in this study to create the 
counterfeit documents, referred to as the experiments. Secondly the authors illustrate the results 
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obtained from the experiments, referred to as the gathered digital forensic artifacts. A summary 
elaborating on the results concludes this section. 
3.1 Experiments 
‘System-generated digital forensic artifacts’ refer to those artifacts created by the application without 
direct user intervention, while ‘user-generated digital forensic artifacts’ refer to artifacts intentionally 
and directly created by the user. The latter are not analysed in this paper. 
The research experiments were conducted in two stages. The first experiment was conducted to 
simulate the activities that can be performed by an offender and is referred to as the 'counterfeiter 
experiment'. The second experiment was carried out to trace the activities of the offender and is 
referred to as the 'investigator experiment'. An explanation of the two experiments follows.  
3.1.1 Counterfeiter experiment: Creating the counterfeit documents 
The researcher created approximately three hundred dummy counterfeit documents by using the 
graphic design applications that were discussed earlier in this text. The motivation behind the creation 
of approximately three hundred documents is as follows. These documents were created during the 
experiment by editing the following four components within a South African Identity Document (ID), 
passport and drivers license: the barcode, fingerprints, signatures, and photographs of human faces. 
This required a combination of twenty four options (4! (Factorial)= 24) on eleven examined file types. 
The combination for all file types equalled two hundred and sixty four (24 x 11), and included a few 
extra repetitions for clarity, yielding almost three hundred documents. This was so that the authors 
could be able to notice the difference or the changes to the digital forensic artifacts as more documents 
are created. Different application versions usually bring about more application capabilities and 
enhanced digital tools which can result in potential changes to digital forensic artifacts. These changes 
will be explained later in the results section.  
Since most graphic design application users prefer the latest editions, the most recent version of 
Adobe, CS5, was used for this study as the base experiment. Further experiments were carried out on 
CS3 and CS4 for comparative purposes. Three different computers were used, each with a different 
Adobe version installed on it. The counterfeit documents were created by performing the actions 
mentioned before (scanning, editing, saving and printing). The ‘platform’ refers to the operating 
system on which the counterfeit documents were created. According to software reviews in 2011, the 
Windows operating system is still ranked most popular [12, 13] and the analysis of digital forensic 
artifacts was consequently conducted on a Windows 7 platform. 
3.1.2 Investigator experiment: Searching for the evidence 
Once the counterfeit documents had been created, experiments were carried out to search for pertinent 
evidence left behind from the use of the graphic design applications. The operating systems’ registry 
editor tool, ‘regedit’ was used to search for associated registry entries, while a hex editor, Winhex [14] 
was used for analysing the binary data of the log files.  
To respond to the problem stated earlier, that there are no digital forensic investigation software tools 
available yet to investigate crimes where graphic design applications can be used for creating 
counterfeit documents; four possible actions taken during the creation of a document were used as a 
hypothesis to gather digital forensic information related to the graphic design applications. The 
analysis is formulated to find the digital forensic information that indicates that the actions (scanning, 
editing, saving and printing) had indeed taken place. By tracking the actions performed, an 
investigator is able to conduct a systematic investigation aimed at acquiring not only the files used to 
create the document, but also the actual documents created to be used as potential evidence. For 
example, if the document was scanned, then the next step would probably be that it was edited. If 
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never scanned then probably it was edited only. In the end, it becomes possible to state if the 
document created was a counterfeit document or not. 
If none of the four actions were taken, then there is no need to ascertain whether the application was 
used for document creation. An illustration of the results from the experiments follows.  
3.2 Results from the experiments: Gathered digital forensic artifacts 
The discussion that follows highlights the digital forensic artifacts found in graphic design 
applications where the source of the potential evidence is mainly system-generated and results derive 
mostly from application log files.  
Experimental results obtained from digital forensic artifacts related to the four actions (scan, edit, save 
and print) are elaborated on in each of the subsections to follow. 
3.2.1 Artifacts related to document scanning  
Generally, when one attempts to create a fraudulent document, an original document has to be 
acquired to imitate or copy its identity. Scanning is a common option that results in the original 
document being available on computer for digital editing. The different models of scanners that are 
currently available use various software packages for executing scan commands. For the purposes of 
this research, the focus is therefore on commands generated from within the graphic design application 
and used for editing the scanned document.  
Adobe Photoshop has the capability to scan a document using the ‘import WIA support’ document 
menu option. The document scanned is loaded into a destination folder as prompted. The application 
creates a folder, saves the scanned image and opens the scanned image in the application.  
After a document is scanned, the application records the digital artifact (evidence for scanning) into 
one of its log files named Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs.psp located in 
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Adobe\Adobe Photoshop CSX\Adobe Photoshop CSX 
Settings. The X in CSX represents the version of the graphic design application, which can be 3, 4 or 5. 
After the authors analysed this psp log file, they identified an entry recorded of the location of the 
scanned file at certain address offsets to be discussed in section 3.3 summary. Through examining this 
location, the authors were able to identify the copies of the original documents scanned for possible 
counterfeiting.  
Adobe In-Design is not capable of scanning a document. In this case, if the application used cannot 
scan a document. Then the user could use the scanners own software, this means that the scanned 
document will be loaded into the application through the “place” function. As long as the application 
user has inserted the scanned document into the graphic design application, it is possible to trace the 
particular image inserted as shall be described in the sub section “artifacts related to document 
editing”.  Even if not all actions are exercised(scan, edit, save and print), the traces obtained from any 
recognised actions are used to determine, for example what was inserted in the document and what the 
saved document created is. This would enable an investigator to visualise these aspects and determine 
if a counterfeit document was created.  
After scanning, the regular process followed by a potential criminal is to edit the acquired document in 
a bid to falsify its content. This editing process is discussed in the next section.  
3.2.2 Artifacts related to document editing  
Document editing is one of the important stages of creating a counterfeit document as it allows one to 
insert objects of interest. For example, a human face, a bar code or a fingerprint can be inserted in the 
scanned document. A number of editing actions can be performed, including typing, colouring or 
drawing. Our focus is on editing by insertion of an image or object, as this can later be used to 
determine if the document created was counterfeit or not. Regarding inserted objects, experiments 
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were executed to establish what can be inferred from a system that indicates to the examiner what was 
inserted and from which location it was inserted. The terms ‘inserting’, ‘attaching’ or ‘placing’ an 
image are considered to refer to the same action, though called differently in various applications. In 
this paper, the term ‘inserting’ is used henceforth.  
The same log file, Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs, records digital information with the name of the 
inserted file and the location from which it was inserted.  
Adobe In-Design can also perform the action of inserting an image into a document. In-Design log 
files consist of FindChangeData, FontMaskCache, In_DesignDragDrop and idletask. This application 
records digital artifacts for editing entries into one of its log files. The log file named InDesign 
SavedData (without a file extension), which is located at C:\Users\ <username>\ 
AppData\Local\Adobe\ InDesign\Version 5.0\Cache, contains the information that indicates the name 
of the location from which an image was inserted. Unlike Adobe Photoshop, Adobe In-Design only 
records the folder location or the path of the inserted images, and not the full name of the inserted 
image. 
From these locations, the authors were able to obtain the actual images used during document editing, 
for example, images of a human face and fingerprint images. These images are essentially necessary 
for counterfeit investigations as they can be used for compare to the images within the suspect 
counterfeit document. 
3.2.3 Artifacts related to document saving  
Once a document has been edited, the user (or potential criminal) usually needs to save it either for 
later printing or further editing. In this section the authors examine what is found in the system relating 
to saved documents. This information is vital as it can point to an examiner the name of the potentially 
fraudulent saved file and where the file was saved to. If the file was deleted or moved, search 
commands can also be generated based on the names of the files saved. This is done by specifying the 
name of the file when searching, thereby extending the search filter or search domain during an 
investigation.  
Adobe Photoshop log file records the digital artifacts that indicate saving entries. The same log file, 
Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs, contains information about the name, location and type of the saved 
file.  
The log file InDesign SavedData contains information about the name and type of the file that has 
been saved, as well as the location to which the file was saved.  
In both cases, the names are arranged in order of the last saved file first. From this information the 
authors managed to obtain the documents created by the graphic design application and recognise the 
ones which are counterfeit documents.  
Adobe Photoshop records both the name of the ‘saving folder’ location and the full name of the saved 
file. The name of the ‘saving folder’ is recorded in the beginning of the log file, while the entry with 
the names of the saved files appears towards the middle of the log file. It is noted that the log file 
records a maximum of 22 entries of saved files. As more files are saved, the log file overwrites the 
older entries with new entries. Adobe In-Design records an unlimited number of saved documents. 
The digital artifacts for saved documents can be verified or compared to the registry entries. Values for 
the visited directories are acquired from the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\ Software 
\Adobe\Photoshop\<version #>\VisitedDirs. Generally, saved files from any graphic design 
application can also be verified or checked by looking at recent documents available in folder 
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\ Microsoft\Windows\Recent.  
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3.2.4 Artifacts related to document printing 
Printing is one of the last stages of counterfeit document creation. A user might need to create a hard 
copy of the edited document so that it can be used in a physical environment. Unlike scanning actions, 
printing actions can be commanded from all the graphic design applications in question via the print 
menu command. The artifacts illustrated in this section are valid for any of the examined graphic 
design applications. To locate which printer(s) are used to print a document, one uses the registry 
entries below. The registry keys from which a list of printer connections can be established are the 
following: 
(1)HKLM\soft\Adobe\Photoshop\11.0\Plugin path. 
(2) HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Printers       
(3) HKEY_USERS\\<username>\\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts 
(4) HKEY_USERS\<username>\Software\Microsoft\ Installer\Products\<productid>\SourceList 
After establishing the names of the printers from the above, the physical existence of the printers can 
be verified. This usually assists an investigator in cases where the actual printers have been removed. 
Physical printers are necessary in an investigation so as to match the digital evidence to the actual 
printer for supporting a case during court proceedings.  
For each print job, two spool files are generated by the operating system located in 
C:\Windows\System32\spool\ PRINTERS. The first is XXXXX.shd and the second is XXXXX.spl, where 
XXXXX represents the job number in decimal format. Analysing the binary data of these files indicates 
the name of the spooled document. Additionally, print jobs that were queued to print but have not 
actually been printed yet can also be found within print spools. Table 1 shows the recognised printing 
artifacts including examples.  
Table 1 Address offsets for printed documents 
Recognised 
printing artifact 
Spool file 
containing artifact 
Address offset for 
recognised artifact 
(in HEX) 
Example 
Name of printed 
document 
spl 0X20 Johnstone_passport_final_edit.psd 
Name of printer shd 0X88 HP Laserjet 2605_2605dnPCL 
Name of printer 
(repeat) 
shd 0X3B0 HP Laserjet 2605_2605dnPCL 
Name of the 
application that 
generated the print 
request 
shd 0X2120 Adobe Photoshop CS5 
Username and name 
of file 
shd 0X2400 Robert_graphics_editor. 
Johnstone_passport_final_edit.psd 
 
The column and row headings for Table 1 are briefly explained for the sake of clarity. Recognised 
printing artifact is the name of the digital artifact obtained from the stated print spool file (column 
Spool file containing artifact). Address offset for recognised artifact represents the address pointer in 
hexadecimal format for the digital artifact, pointing to the named artifact contained in the spool file. 
Example is an example of a digital artifact for the recognised printing artifact. Name of printer is the 
address offset where an entry of the name of the printer that generated the print job can be found, and 
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this entry is repeated at another place in the shd spool file as shown in the second column Name of 
printer (repeat). The reason for this repetition is not known, however, as far as digital forensic 
evidence is concerned, the repetition merely confirms again that the printer that was indeed used. 
Name of the application that generated the print request is the offset of the name of the application 
that generated the print job. Username and name of file is the address offset of the name of the user 
that generated the print job and the name of the printed potential counterfeit document (evidence for 
printing).  
3.3 Summary 
A log file may consist of thousands of pages of binary data, of which only a few pages will 
contain the required digital forensic artifacts, which, in addition, may be scattered throughout 
these few pages. Figure 1 shows an example of an Adobe log file, indicating a path recognised for 
scanned documents. 
One can use a hex editor to scroll, for example, approximately 60% down the log file consisting of 
thousands of pages to reveal the evidence that is required. This can result in wasting too much time 
and, ultimately, running the risk that critical evidence being omitted from the search. 
 
Figure 1 graphic design application log file containing 16980 pages 
 Another reason for recognising the locations of digital forensic information is that the digital forensic 
artifacts from the log files do not make use of evidence identifiers such as prefixes and tags. (Evidence 
identifiers are discussed in the previously mentioned paper by the authors [16]) In other words, the 
investigator does not know what to search for using keyword searching. The chart presented in this 
section guide the investigator to look for this evidence at a pre-determined location, for example, about 
six tenths (or three fifths) down the file. It is therefore necessary to identify the location of this 
information by making use of radar chart in order to pinpoint where the evidence can be found 
within the log file. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the digital forensic artifacts within the 
Photoshop psp log file. 
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Figure 2 A graphic illustration of digital artifacts distribution in a Photoshop log file 
The chart in Figure 2 shows that the digital forensic artifacts are located mostly in the middle of the 
log file for any action. In this chart, the centre represents the beginning of the log file represented by a 
0 and the outer edges represent the end of the log file represented by a 1. The numbers one to fifty 
represent the number of counterfeit documents created. Such a chart helps the examiner to appreciate 
that they can access most of the information at the same location inside a log file. Figure 3 illustrates 
the distribution of digital forensic artifacts within the log file, Indesign Save data. 
 
Figure 3 A graphic illustration of digital artifacts distribution in an Adobe In-Design log file 
The radar chart (figure 3) shows that most digital forensic artifacts from the Adobe In-Design log file 
are located towards the end of the file. Some, however, are scattered all over the file from the 
beginning until the end. It can be recognised that the radar charts do not contain printing distribution; 
this is because the printing artifacts outlined in section 3.2.4 are fixed address offsets as displayed in 
Table 1. 
Based on the experiments conducted in this study, the authors managed to establish the locations to 
which scanned documents were saved. In these locations one could discover several other counterfeit 
documents that were scanned. In respect of the action of editing, the authors established the names, file 
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types and file locations of inserted objects. By tracking the latter, the actual insertions were recognised 
by means of fingerprints and human face images inserted into the counterfeit documents. The saving 
action enabled the researchers to recognise potential digital evidence that reveal the location of the 
actual counterfeit documents created. The printing action exposed registry and spool files that revealed 
the names of the printers that had been used for document printing, as well as the names of those 
documents printed. 
4. DISCUSSION 
Given that a digital forensic investigation was initiated into a suspected counterfeit document creation 
crime, and given that the document was generated using a graphic design application, a digital forensic 
examiner can use the identified digital forensic artifacts to establish the route along which the 
document was created and corroborate the gathered evidence. For example, the digital forensic 
examiner is able to discover the human face, fingerprint, and/or bar code images that were used to 
create the counterfeit document. The inserted image can then be compared to match the image in the 
suspected counterfeit document. Such evidence can be presented in a court of law for prosecution. 
Presenting proof of the actions taken during the process of document tampering (scanning, editing, 
saving and printing) provides valuable support when a case of counterfeit document creation is 
brought before the court as evidence indicating how the document was created and what entities were 
used to create the document. In the end, determining if the system was used for counterfeiting 
purposes. 
These results are essential for a digital forensic examiner to find and locate digital evidence related to 
the creation of counterfeit documents. This increases the transparency and reliability of the 
investigation process in cases where the crime tool was a graphic design application. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned before, that previously-published work, i.e., user-generated digital forensic evidence in 
graphic design applications [16], involves detecting a counterfeit document directly created by the 
user. That research lead to another question whether there exist system-generated evidence indirectly 
created by a system rather than directly created by a user, which then led to this paper, which identifies 
if a system was used for counterfeiting purposes. 
The gathering of system-generated digital forensic evidence is effective in addressing cases where 
counterfeit document editing is largely associated with particular graphic design applications. 
Although this approach addresses only case studies involving Adobe products, the same can be done 
for other graphic design applications and for many other types of applications. A shortcoming of the 
approach is, however, that it does not tackle issues where the user only edits a hard copy, or scans and 
prints without using any pre-installed graphic design application. Another drawback of this approach 
is the fact that this exercise needs to be carried out on all new graphic design applications in order to 
detect where exactly potential evidence can be found within such a new graphic design application.  
The techniques discussed in this paper can, however, be incorporated in commercial digital forensic 
tools like FTK or Encase, or it can possibly be used in the design of a new digital forensic 
investigation tool capable of specifically detecting counterfeit document creation. For example, a tool 
can be created similar to the ‘porn detection stick’ created by Paraben [15], which is a thumb drive 
device that scans and detects pornographic content on a computer. 
Future research can include administering this process to other graphic design applications such as 
CorelDraw and also to other types of applications that could similarly be used to commit digital 
document fraud. 
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